CAF Digital Campaign Plan: First Thoughts
The first public analysis of the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. Download link for plan included.
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As of now, this newsletter/blog will not be consistent and will be based on whatever short writing I have the inspiration to do at the time. Presently I am planning to do a deeper review looking at existing cyber-related defence blueprint and projects and their status.
Background
In June 2022, the Department of National Defence (DND)/Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) released the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. It would take me nearly seven months to actually see the document. At the time, the announced “release” of the strategy was all in name, when it was not actually released to the public. At some point between November 2022 and January 2023, an addition to the announcement was added which says stakeholders may reach out to receive a copy of the plan itself. A review of the internet archive confirms that this was added at a later date and not on the original posting date.
I would gather that it was eventually added because in July/August 2022 I submitted an access to information process request to receive (1) the CAF Digital Campaign plan; and (2) emails and correspondence related to the drafting of the plan. While certainly my request for #2 bore out of frustration on a lack of public release of the plan, it may eventually shed some light on why DND/CAF leadership has been so hesitant to be upfront about the problems facing DND/CAF’s digital landscape.
As of the posting of this analysis, the CAF Digital Campaign Plan has been made public on the official DND/CAF website.
BLUF
Doesn’t sugar-coat the state of cyber capabilities in DND/CAF.
It perhaps does not paint the precise difficult state IM/IT in DND/CAF is presently in, but does illustrate the large hill in front of the forces.
DND/CAF is seeking to adopt a digital maturity model to advance digital transformation throughout the CAF.
Two major milestones established to be “Digitally Enabled” by 2025 and “Digitally Transformed” by 2030.
The good:
Begins to breakdown and provide preliminary structure to digital transformation throughout DND/CAF. The digital maturity “mountain” is manageable as preliminary hills and summits.
Although it is a planning document does not refer to any specific project, it provides significant intelligence for potential primes for business capture activities. For SMEs, it provides avenues and potentials to sell your product
Software-defined capabilities is not something DND/CAF is ready to embrace, it is something DND/CAF wants to work towards which provides opportunities for how primes and SMEs can engage.
The bad:
I remain even more confused as to why this plan was not released when it was originally announced. It is of particular importance for industry to begin planning immediately and for DND/CAF to increase engagement with industry.
I am not too optimistic about their timeline. The gap between “Digitally Aware” and “Digitally Enabled” is much too severe unless the new Defence CIO makes major changes in the next two years to dramatically change the direction of digital capabilities in the forces.
Introduction & CDS Foreword
The CAF Digital Campaign Plan is the CAF’s overall strategy to digitize the forces, also known as digital transformation. Definitions on what digital transformation is will vary, certainly DND/CAF has described and pushed for digital transformation in many ways over the last couple of decades, but what exactly is digital transformation beyond the platitudes of digital change? My initial review of the CAF Digital Campaign plan appears to attempt this, and principally to adopt a digital maturity model.
The foreword is important to read as it fundamentally recognizes the core of digital transformation, which is about the enablement of people to deliver on their missions. Resistance to digital transformation is not about changing what you are doing. Fundamentally, digital transformation is about incorporating digital capabilities to improve, enhance, automate, or augment existing practices. This is about a simple recognition that digital capabilities are faster and more efficient than humans. To digitally transform is easy, but to do it right is hard.
1. Context and Imperatives
The substantive content begins with establishing what is guiding Canadian strategic military thinking regarding digital capabilities. The three key recent conflicts which inform CAF’s thinking about digital thinking are: Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Ukraine. Each of these conflicts do provide some pivotal lessons learned and present the pressing situation for the CAF: cyber operations, unmanned systems, sensors-to-shooters, and autonomous systems are all specifically cited as changing the battlefield and digital space. While all grouped together, it is important to note that how each of these are used in conflicts are dramatically different, but their effective integration to augment capabilities is central to fighting pan-domain conflicts.
No adversaries are specifically mentioned, but the key takeaway is that states and non-state actors are adversaries in digital spaces. Although the plan cites that digital technologies can easily be shared and scaled, it is more so the act that the ability to inflict harm through cyberspace is equal between states and non-state actors.
In touching on allies in this space, the plan recognizes the imperative to interoperate with allies, specifically citing the need to work with the United States, Five Eyes, NATO, and with domestic departments/agencies, and civilian authorities.
The plan says that the “CAF has comparative advantages in leading and coordinating multi-national and Pan-Domain operations” and that leveraging this with digital capabilities will allow the CAF to provide operational leadership where allies can “plug-in.” As an abstract idea this initially seems like a good idea, but I am hesitant and question the procurement system’s ability to produce something. On an initial read, the concept makes sense that having digital capabilities and networking would allow trusted allies to integrate on the fly. However, this flies against the wind and assumes there is little change in the context that would allow the CAF to adopt this role.
Although digital transformation can be a seamless process, the fact that it has been a major headache for DND/CAF would suggest that there will not be an automatic recognition of Canadian digital operational leadership. This will be determined by how the digital transformation process progresses, how DND/CAF procures and adopts digital capabilities, but principally it is the political will above the CAF which will determine most of this. Without getting too sidetracked, most of the problems in developing and procuring digital and cyber capabilities are not because of DND/CAF (although that is not to say that there is some blame that goes there).
This is perhaps what gives rise to the last part of this section, which is a discussion of “our people.“ Importantly this is referring to the Canadian public’s expectation that the CAF “become digital,” which is an important qualifier to stress throughout the forces. While there are systemic and structural issues to digital transformation over the last decade for DND/CAF, this point underlines how digital transformation is about pushing people out of their comfort zone. Those of us already digitally enabled and working in this field view such moves as the efficient and productive move to make, but this is grounded in our high level of digital literacy allowing for this. Those like us are not the target or concern for this strategy, but can be viewed in two ways:
For those already knowledgeable or working in this area it lays out expectations, plans, and provides predictability. This Digital Campaign Plan should be understood as establishing a new baseline and agenda to make up for the last decade.
For those not knowledgeable or not working in this area, it establishes a different set of expectations. Too long has anything IM/IT/cyber been relegated to the “techs,” while others were not expected to have a level of understanding or contribute to a digitally-enabled force. The plan is establishing a fundamental paradigm and doctrinal standard, which is that the entire Defence Team is responsible for this endeavor. Reluctance due to unfamiliarity cannot be taken as an excuse.
CAF must work and be reflective of Canadian society, which includes digital capabilities that support the combat forces and the entire bureaucratic system which sustains it. However, what is needed is to embrace change and a shift from conducting business by requiring those wanting change to defend their action to requiring those who resist change to justify their resistance.
The section ends by noting that DND/CAF is presently working on a strategic level Digital Strategy. This is news to me and is good news. In addition to an overall Digital Strategy in the works, it notes multiple other strategies in the works including a Data Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence Strategy. This section may be the most telling about how to understand the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. In order to make up for the lost time, DND/CAF have a lot to do in the coming years and digital literacy is a major skill that needs developed, which will be talked in greater detail in the next section.
Fundamentally, this is a policy document and not a strategic or inherently technical in nature. The poor policy and management of DND/CAF digital capabilities is what has led to a capability absence. As such, those who work on policy should view this as establishing the strategic imperative that there is a need to use and establish policy which enables the use and procurement of digital capabilities.
For operators, bearing in mind you’re already stretched thin in your work, your expertise is what will guide digital maturity and what will be integrated throughout the forces. Push for early adoption.
2. Digital Maturity Model
The inclusion (and adoption) of the digital maturity model caught me partly by surprise, but is a very welcome addition. Although I personally don’t have any opinions about the model itself as a tool, it begins to show that DND/CAF is thinking about what to do and the steps to get there.
The digital maturity model is one widely used in the private sector, and provides an easy way to view where the CAF presently is at, which is simply Digitally Aware. The Campaign Plan rightly identifies this, exemplified by the existence of many analog systems and processes and low levels of digital literacy. To what degree DND/CAF are on the way to digitally enabbled is something I am unable to answer, and likely no one but the new DND Digital Transformation Office will be able to (eventually) answer. Typical of this approach is “decentralized efforts” of CAF digitization, which I and other CAF docouments have referred to as ad hoc efforts of developing digital capabilities. This gives rise to what appears to be the two initial core objectives to achieving digital maturity:
Convert analog systems to digital; and
Improve digital literacy.
In many ways this is a chicken or the egg scenario, whereby one of the biggest obstacles to converting existing analog systems are those with insufficient digital literacy who say no. It is for this reason why I stress the need to problematize those who are sustaining this resistance to digital services and capabilities. Resistance to change and innovation is the recipe for military disaster.
However, the plan suggests that once the CAF has digitally transformed, that CAF digital transformation efforts “will be coordinated, coherent, and comprehensive to achieve enhanced operational advantage in the battle space and improved stewardship in the corporate space.” This is inherently part of the problem that has led DND/CAF to where it is today. The coordination and coherency of these digital transformation efforts is critically what has delayed , in significant part due to bureaucratic resistance and procurement issues that has desperately needed more attention by senior DND/CAF leadership and cabinet.
While perhaps the idea is that once the CAF has digitally transformed that all of this will occur as second nature and as core doctrine to working digitally in the forces, but the coordination of such cannot be left to individual units and expect digital transformation in a timely manner. Bearing in mind that DND/CAF needed digital transformation to start last decade, there needs to be more engagement on how to adopt agile methods specifically with the objective to mainstream digital transformation throughout DND/CAF.
The plan recognizes that digital transformation will be asymmetrical throughout the forces is the objective, but it seems like this may have been misunderstood to mean that digital transformation will not be coherent until the forces have become digitally transformed. Yes, this is as tautological as you may think it is. Although the adoption and transition to digital services and capabilities is asymmetrical, this asymmetry is not because digital transformation isn’t being coordinated or organized, but because of organizational resistance. Organizations, especially ones with such rigid hierarchy as the military, have a tendency for organizations to resist change.
In addition to a general organizational resistance, we have to take into account the granularity of digital transformation. Digital transformation will look tremendously different from an organizational DND/CAF perspective of capabilities compared to that of each of the services, and even more different on a unit-by-unit basis. Although coordination at all of these levels is likely not possible until the CAF has digitally transformed, but it is dangerous to assume that transformation can occur without coordination. The creation of the Digital Transformation Office (DTO), which would not be officially created until 6 months after this plan was “released,” hopefully means that this lack of coordination is recognized and will leader these efforts.
3. Elements of Digital Transformation
The elements of digital transformation are referred to as the five “levers of change” meant to be the manner to view digital transformation.
- People – People at the forefront of the transformation
o While people implement this plan, digital transformation is fundamentally meant to enable people to improve efficiency. (Helps with reconstitution!)
- Data – Centrality of data
o The entire premise of computers is to handle data. DND/CAF have vast amounts of data at its disposal, even in non-digital formats. Data must be leveraged to increase efficiency, remove bias, and hasten decision making.
- Process – Unified Plan
o Perhaps my favorite part: No more ad hoc!
o Ensure a unified, coherent plan to shift processes to digital formats
o Support adaptive procurement
- Technology – Invest in Foundation
o This speaks a lot to infrastructure, including adopting cloud as a foundation to adopting AI and “smart process[es]”
o This seems to suggest what I have been arguing, which is that Canada should prioritize the procurement of classified cloud as a means to kickstart CAF digital transformation.
- Culture – Build an agile and nimble organizational culture
o Digital competency needs to be a central concern to what it means to be a Canadian soldier.
o When will digital literacy become a core component to being a soldier?
4. Digital Campaign Plan Principles
In many ways this restates the elements of digital transformation, but in active verbiage to communicate how to view and understand the elements of digital transformation in practice. Rather than restart and provide commentary on all of them, I will attempt to paraphrase in a paragraph:
Digital transformation is about empowering leaders at all levels to ensure effective command and control in a pan-domain environment. This is done by placing people at the forefront of the process by communicating and engaging widely throughout the CAF to build and leverage a culture of innovation and agility. Through constant test and readjustment, digital services and processes can be adopted through embracing technology and recognizing the value of data.
5. Vision
“The CAF will become digitally transformed by 2030. The digitally transformed CAF will be relevant, resilient, interoperable, integrated, and efficient. Through a stable, resilient and adaptive technology and security backbone and with a mature, common and accessible data mesh, we will establish a digital foundation for the application layer that will revolutionize the way we process, analyse, present and deliver the insights garnered from data to better inform decision-makers. These digital capabilities will be secure, integrated, accessible, intuitive, and delivered at the speed of operations. Our enhanced decision-making will provide an operational advantage in the Battle Space, and improved stewardship in the Corporate Space.”
The 2030 date is one being thrown around a lot and I am beginning to think it is an arbitrary number in the future chosen for political reasons. The last I heard about the timeline for the procurement of classified cloud was for 2030. Either this is wrong, which I would be happy to accept, and DND/CAF will procure a lot more digital capabilities in the next few years including cloud. However, if it is true that deliver of classified cloud will not occur until 2030 or at least very late this decade, then there is no way that the CAF will be digitally transformed by 2030.
Adopting cloud/classified cloud will taken time to deploy as any system-wide deployment would naturally take, but factoring in transitioning analog to digital (and to cloud for what remains in that process), and to work through the various issues with the system and achieve system-wide understanding of the system? 2030 is a very optimistic plan that will require major DND/CAF system-wide engagement and focus on top of the major political will needed above DND/CAF.
6. Strategic Outcomes
This next section again breaks down the overall vision but attempts to contextualize it to military-specific parlance and streams. I am not sure how useful or successful this is in translating digital transformation to the respective areas. While as abstract concepts it potentially motivates those in the areas to consider how digital transformation and digital capabilities fit in these areas. It may be a bit too abstract for use by the apparent target audience for this document.
7. Obstacles and Benefits
7.1 Obstacles of Digital Transformation
This section amounts to bullet points and general roadblocks that will be faced in the digital transformation process. Overall, the concerns are quite valid and good to bear in mind going forward, maybe except for the first obstacle.
“If the CAF becomes enamoured with technology and forgets that war and conflict are human endeavours we risk forgetting that digital transformation is about people. The CAF must remember that technology enables capabilities, but does not comprise them.”
I would consider this an obstacle in itself and does not understand technology or capabilities, and possibly would consider it a straw man argument. DND/CAF is not procuring digital capabilities for the sake of digital capabilities. The entire point of the defense procurement process (identification, options analysis, definition, implementation, and close out) is meant to ensure that the technology and capabilities are being selected and integrated into DND/CAF in a purposeful and productive way.
Does that always occur? Absolutely not, Canadian defense procurement is messy and inefficient and is meant to get the right capability for the best price. To have this as the first concern is more of a signal to those working on digital transformation that there are people in DND/CAF who think technology is being procured just because we are enamored with it. Such a statement is quite disrespectful for the rigid, complex systems in place in the CAF and government that go into procuring such capabilities. The fact that DND/CAF are at least 15 years behind in digital transformation compared to the US, Canada’s closest ally that Canada is deeply integrated with, highlights that the need to digitally transform as a strategic imperative to maintain relationships and to maintain the CAF’s ability to deploy and operate with allies.
The other obstacles are ones either already acknowledged or quite understandable in digital transformation:
Internal biases which favor status quo over digital transformation
Insufficient resources dedicated to digital transformation.
Being overly programmatic and being too risk-averse.
Not moving quickly enough can contribute to stunting initiative of digital transformation and risks being viewed as a hollow initiative
Digital transformation means systemic and structural changes in how DND/CAF functions on a day to day basis. As a result, DND/CAF must ensure no one is left behind in this process and DND/CAF are actively listening to address concerns and problems to the process.
This last obstacle is perhaps what the first obstacle discussed was meant to discuss. Digital capabilities provide a host of potential to improve work and make life easier for everyone in DND/CAF by reducing time needed on administrative tasks and improve efficiency on others. For this to occur, digital literacy must be improved to have everyone engage in this process. However, free riders are inherent to any system. Free riders, or those that benefit from a system without contributing much in return, are not inherently a malicious thing.
As an example, consider CAF light infantry and how the CAF’s infantry are getting their own digital transformation with the Integrated Soldier System Project. Certain CAF infantry are participating in pilot projects to test and determine how to best operate and integrate these new communications capabilities into their teams. However, Not everyone is doing this. The Integrated Soldier System Project achieved initial operational capability in June 2018, but it would take until March 2023 to achieve full operational capability. The time this take for implementation is not just about time to make and deliver the capability, but is about the CAF working with the system to get hands on knowledge of how to use it, what doesn’t work, what is lacking or needed. The DND/CAF and procurement personnel that are involved in this process are those that this document referring to and the need to think about the organization and concerns in how they make these subsequent decisions about the Integrated Soldier System Project.
The free riders in this project are the infantry and others that will use the new radios, assaulter hubs, laser range finders, but did not contribute to the procurement process at all. Were they expected to contribute to it? No, we likely do not want everyone to contribute in that same manner. The takeaway from this is that there are free riders in any program or project, either maliciously or purposefully, and is not something to be overly concerned about. Engaged leadership which is concerned about the whole of the organization and how technology enables an organization. ICT can be a very powerful tool for empowering individuals to be engaged and to voice their thoughts, which should be leveraged in the digital transformation process. Fundamentally, DND/CAF must foster buy in to the digital transformation process itself, which is deeply rooted in digital literacy.
7.2 Benefits of Digital Transformation
In many ways whereas the obstacles are broadly speaking to bureaucratic and policy challenges to digital transformation, the benefits section appear to focus on force structures, force development, and force generation. While this is the very point of digital transformation for a military, it is perhaps almost tone deaf to the obstacles which makes sure to stress a need to not forget about the people that digital transformation is meant to support and enable.
The major points are on the benefits of digital transformation are sound from a purely defense or operational viewpoint, as such I will not restate them here as the benefits you will hear endlessly, including: improved communication, faster and more efficient procurement, better resource management, automation of tasks, and more.
While overall I have no issues with this section, but I question to what degree this does not focus enough on the benefits of digital literacy and bureaucratic efficiency. Much of this is insinuated in its discussion of realigning the workforce, automation, and augmentation of tasks, but this is predominantly referring to present issues with retention in the forces. It’s speaking to how digital capabilities will help retain individuals because people expect and want to be digital in the workplace. Whilst true to a degree, this misunderstands the problem of why digital capabilities are wanted in the workplace. It’s not about doing what they’re comfortable with and expect, but about working in a 21st century environment. A reliance on paper forms for administrative tasks and processes certainly gets work done but is overly time-consuming. This is time that can be better spent elsewhere either on the organization itself, or more time for the individual in their free time. Nevertheless, it does correctly identify that digital capabilities can and will free up the workforce significantly by reducing time spent on tedious tasks, allowing time spent on other activities that intrinsically reduces the need for more people. The desire for these capabilities is not only about expectations, but principally out of frustration. The patience of those in DND/CAF working against 10+ year old digital capabilities that can barely sustain the current access and capabilities of DWAN.
This may appear as parsing words and phrasing, but it is important to understand this as priming and influencing how the CAF understands digital transformation and how individuals engage with it. “Expectations” framed as an external variable influencing DND/CAF digital transformation shifts the onus of digital transformation away from CAF itself to the individuals who have these “expectations.” This is important to consider as it frames the way that the CAF views this problem, which is being framed as external societal pressure on the forces. This is entirely false. It is better to view DND/CAF’s lack of digital transformation as existential in nature. The expectations should be from DND/CAF itself to operate as a modern defense department and military. The present lack of policy and digital capabilities makes it enormously difficult for the CAF to be called a modern military.
8. Operational Design
With the operational design we begin to see some formation of a timeline and strategic outcomes that provide a preliminary framing that lends itself to creating concrete objectives to measure progress. I have gotten a view of this mission statement before, which now makes more sense in the context of the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. Each of these lines of effort already have stated objectives with sub-points of what each objective should look like as the CAF progresses in its digital transformation. These objectives I will list and talk in more detail below.
9. Lines of Effort
As shown in the previous section, achieving digital maturity in DND/CAF is divided along four lines of effort with set milestones of 2025 and 2030. Critical to remember is that digital transformation is a process and achieving institutional change that embraces and accepts digital transformation to achieve digital maturity is not about checking off a list. Digital transformation, with digital maturity as the end goal, should principally be about enabling the CAF to recognize and understand the utility of digital capabilities, the risks associated with it, and work to adopt such capabilities in a way that fosters innovation as opposed to preventing as a matter of policy.
Many of the objectives listed below implicitly recognize this fact. It also recognizes that how each of the objectives will change as the CAF matures and develops its institutional capacity and matures digitally. The downside to this is that it makes measuring CAF digital transformation at the beginning stages of the process difficult because there is little visibility on specifics, and even less data regarding those specifics. This fundamental lack of information and its translation into data is what will be the most crucial institutional enabler.
9.1 Manage Digital Transformation
Objective 1.1: Align existing governance structures to enable deeper integration of disparate efforts across the CAF
Objective 1.2: Achieve unity of effort through increased horizontal alignment and a coherent CAF Digital Campaign Plan
Objective 1.3: Produce and monitor the Implementation Plan to achieve continuous improvement
I gain some level of comfort that the first objectives of digital transformation is to actually manage it, which is a divergence from previous methodology to digital capabilities whereby the belief is that it’ll manage itself. Even more good news, Objective 1.1 specifically cites that a digitally aware CAF has had ad hoc policy and governance.
The explicit details of each of these means little for here, but fundamentally it is about organizing a whole of the Defence Team behind digital transformation. Under the plan, it is expected that the CAF will be Digitally Enabled, which means digital governance will be included in all business and operational processes and digital transformation will be monitored and organized on an enterprise-wide scale. The problem with this is it requires dramatic, fast change. These are very ambitious goals and I do not think DND/CAF will meet them by time it expects to be digitally enabled in 2025. However, with the creation of the Digital Transformation Office and new Defence CIO, there is a lot of change and new blood that will come in with ambition and goals to change the system and move the portfolio. The institutional inertia this new leadership can muster under the Digital Campaign Plan will depend on how receptive DND/CAF is as a whole and the ability to prioritize DND/CAF digital capabilities as a national security and defence imperative.
9.2 Enable Pan-Domain Operations
Objective 2.1: Align CAF capability projects and program requirements for data and the technical foundation into a coherent demand signal for Departmental partners.
Objective 2.2: Design, build, and field Pan-Domain Situational Awareness (PDSA) tools and concepts that integrate all domains.
Objective 2.3: Ensure continued interoperability with US, FVEY, and NATO. Promote close alignment with the US Mission Partner Environment and NATO Federated Mission Networking.
I have questioned to what degree that the CAF is able to interoperate with allies due to the slow adoption of digital capabilities. Although I will not say these objectives confirm my concerns that the CAF is unable to, but does confirm that there is a need to be concerned about the CAF’s ability to work maintain its ability to operate with allies. The undercurrent through these objectives is that digital capabilities and digital transformation enable all of the above using many of the same systems and capabilities in each, albeit with differences in processes, but the core is the same.
Thus, it becomes to embrace the processes and concepts of digital transformation and capabilities. If you become reliant upon teaching by capability, you learn to use based on the capability as opposed to what you are accomplishing with the capability. As an example, everyone is familiar with writing software. Microsoft Word, Open Office, Google Docs, no matter the specific software used we can sit in front of one and begin writing with an expectation and understanding of how to use the software to write. While different software will have less or more niche capabilities that can be learned, the process to use one is quite a basic concept that we all learn.
In many ways this is illustrating the importance of digital literacy. Digital literacy is not just about understanding how to use computers, but being able to use critical thinking to use computers to solve problems and improve existing methods. To achieve these objectives is about integrating these practices into force structures and existing practices. This is not about taking the Internet and digital capabilities and figuring out how to use it to make artillery better. Instead, think of it as understanding that cyberspace is already a domain influencing how the military operates. In many ways, the approach becomes taking what we currently already have and finding a digital capability that can replace traditional methods. The hardest part is buy in to the process, but once it has started it can advance quickly as individual will seek to improve the system, which has the potential to go much faster once it is underway. However, it is likely I am being too optimistic about this prospect.
In the end, a failure to conduct digital transformation means that Canada’s ability to operate in a pan-domain environment with allies, particularly the United States, and will damage Canada’s alliances.
9.3 Design and Equip the Digital Force
Objective 3.1: Adopt a Digital-First design approach in all elements of Force Design and development to ensure that the CAF is digitally capable.
Objective 3.2: Develop the capabilities and processes that enable the digitally capable CAF.
Objective 3.3: Design the Digital Workforce that will form the core of the digitally capable CAF.
There is no doubting that the other lines of effort are of critical importance to digital transformation, but these set of objectives are arguably the most important to make or break the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. The CAF has long had the force structures on paper to enable digital transformation and deliver effects and support, but hinderances to this have been multitude, and not isolated to just the CAF. Addressing these objectives principally becomes a problem of force generation. It is one matter to reorient the forces and order digital transformation, but its execution in the face of bureaucratic resistance and general human skepticism to change. However, this goes beyond any normal resistance to change we may be familiar with, but have to contend with systemic and structural barriers in DND/CAF and federal government.
To give an idea, some issues facing DND/CAF digital transformation include, but are not limited to:
Insufficient mandates, taskings, authorization and/or orders to carry out tasks of digital transformation or conduct force generation activities related to advanced cyber capabilities.
Limited autonomy of DND/CAF’s IM/IT program compared to others, requiring additional oversight that other areas do not receive in its regular operation.
Said additional oversight over IM/IT have questionable understanding of the subject matter itself.
Limited subject-matter expertise in ADM (Mat), PSPC, and ISED.
This includes both the technical and policy side of cyber/digital capabilities.
Inconsistent and often contradictory federal government and DND/CAF mandates that have prevented movement and delivery of critical services and capabilities
Shared Services Canada’s use of DND/CAF as a source of revenue as opposed to a government partner requiring reliable, secure services.
A misalignment in ITB policy which favors traditional defence-sector busy and does not recognize how the digital economy functions differently.
The misaligned ITB policy also has often led to an over-insistence on Canada-sourced options even if such options are non-existent or inferior.
Hubris related to the ability of DND/CAF to internally develop digital/cyber capabilities.
In part stems from a lack of stakeholder engagement, which has been a considerable sticking point for CADSI and contributes to lack of knowledge internally to DND/CAF and elsewhere in the federal government (PSPC/ISED)
Suffice to say, there are a lot of moving pieces to enable and operationalize the CAF Digital Campaign Plan. However, the core design is having a digital-first mentality. Regardless of the project in question, those involved must acknowledge and state how digital capabilities are included and managed. Only by mandating the centrality of digital transformation that it can succeed.
9.4 Develop the Digital Workforce
Objective 4.1: Deliver a digitally empowered CAF recruiting experience that places recruits at the centre of the process.
Objective 4.2: Develop the digital literacy knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary for CAF members to successfully interact in the current digital world and to shape the CAF of the future.
Objective 4.3: Design the Digital Workforce that will form the core of the digital capable CAF.
This is the section I may have the least number of thoughts about, which generally revolves around recruitment/personnel and digital literacy. I have talked at length about digital literacy and its importance in digital transformation, but little on recruitment and retention. This is an issue that’s long been acknowledged and will always remain an issue. The discussion has often centered around pay and how to compete with the private sector, but this line of effort offers a different path to compete: be a digital workforce to do digital work.
Those who are wanting to work on cyber/digital do so with an expectation that they will do so, not that they will be sent out to Petawawa to setup digital hand radios. To work on emerging and new digital and cyber capabilities to defend Canada is what these people want to do. Give them the opportunity and many will want to stay.
Lastly, by adopting a digital-first approach, it will have knock-on effects to streamline and reduce redundancy throughout the forces through digital transformation. This will help to support present reconstitution efforts. However, it must be strongly cautioned to not expect such efficiency before it occurs. In other words, do not count your chickens before they are hatched.
There will be an urge to try to hasten the digital transformation agenda as to contribute to reconstitution efforts, but DND/CAF must be cautious in doing so lest it get too ahead of itself before figuring out what even works internally to enable digital transformation. As a result, caution is advised on attempts to adopt enterprise-wide capabilities too quickly. Although this may help to advance the digital transformation agenda very well, it must be balanced in relation to digital literacy of the forces. Due to this, DND/CAF should strongly consider the procurement of capabilities and tools for DND/CAF’s network and enterprise architects which improves present services without costing time or money in duplicating activity as newer and more advanced capabilities.
One such immediate area is the DWAN and intranet capacity. If there is one thing I hear consistently about DND/CAF cyber capabilities is a general frustration with DWAN. Belief and buy-in of digital transformation requires a level of trust and confidence on behalf of users. Users must trust and have confidence that the computers and networks they are using will support their needs by being stable, fast, and secure. If users do not have trust and confidence in the systems and networks they are using, then they will not have confidence nor trust in digital transformation. I have previously advocated for the immediate and/or quickened efforts to procure a Classified B cloud networking capability, which I still believe would streamline digital transformation. However, in such a case this capability is procured, if such a network is as reliable as the DWAN then users will have the same amount of trust and confidence with the new network/capability.
9.5 Sustain the Digital Force
Objective 5.1: Maximize the value of our data to improve the stewardship of resources and fully enable operations.
Objective 5.2: Transform Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) through the adoption of modern technologies and processes.
Objective 5.3: Modernize the planning, direction, and delivery of Operational Sustainment.
This final line of effort and objectives provide some of the most concrete actions and objectives to be taken compared with the rest of
A core problem I find with this line of effort is that it almost appears that the purpose of sustaining the digital force is done for its own case as opposed to a necessity which serves to maintain DND/CAF’s digital capabilities so that it can deliver on its mission to defend Canada. It is not enough to “maximize the value of data” when data hold little to no value presently in DND/CAF.
The core to sustaining the digital force is one part the valuation of data, and two parts use of said data. Over-compartmentalization of data and information has led to DND/CAF holdings of mass amounts of data that receive minimal use, if they are used at all. Recent unclassified reviews suggests that data is valued in the CAF, but a lack of infrastructure, planning, and policy means many go unused. By maintaining at least 180 different databases, it suggests that data and information is already quite valued, but there exists little capacity to harness and use the data in many cases.
A transformation of the defense enterprise network must take into account not only how such data holdings are used, but how DND/CAF incorporates such data holdings into its plans for digital literacy and design.
From Plan into Action (The So What?)
The first question I would put forth is who is this plan actually intended? For people like myself, I have been wanting and calling for such a document for years, but DND/CAF are certainly not in the business to produce documents for researchers like myself that pick apart the difference in wording between two different documents in the uncertain hope of identifying information about DND/CAF digital and cyber capabilities. The CAF Digital Campaign Plan it lays out quite a cohesive plan from a force structure perspective and my initial impressions. It is the implementation of the plan where things will fall apart, as with many of the previous efforts.
Not mentioned in the plan is the Digital Transformation office (DTO), which would not be stood up until November 2022 (About 5 months after the internal publication of the Digital Campaign Plan).
There is a fundamental need to change how to enable activities to produce digital transformation and change. Too much justification is spent on why things should be done, instead of not enough time spent on why it should not be done. The onus is on those who bring forth or attempt change against a rigid, bureaucratic system. While admittedly such rigid and formulaic systems are in place to avoid conflict of interest and ensure the Government of Canada is getting the best capability it can get for the best price, but what is the real cost of adding roadblocks as a matter of policy?
This can be described in a host of ways but I like to view this in terms of being risk averse.
Conclusion
Read it!
The plan’s conclusion contains some good points to wrap up, but for a conclusion here I have to recommend simply reading the plan. It is a short, to the point 20 page document that reads easier than this analysis.
